Joseph W.H. Lough
The current revolt in Turkey points up the serious deficiencies underlying nearly all of our most popular measures showing where and how individuals will express dissatisfaction with their overall condition. When over the weekend I scrambled to my standard indices, I found the following:
In the Happy Planet Index, Turkey ranks 45th, certainly not great, but still with a preponderance of countries ranked below it.
On the Human Development Index, developed by Amartya Sen and Mahbub-ul-Haq,Turkey ranks 90th, perhaps offering a more accurate read of human discontent. When adjusted for inequality, Turkey does slightly better, at 66th. In either case, however, Turkey’s ranking begs the question: why aren’t countries ranked below Turkey expressing open discontent against their conditions?
Usually at this point I can rely upon the nineteenth century German economic theorist GWF Hegel to help me out. According to Hegel, we should anticipate that levels of educational achievement and institutional integration will shape levels of discontent. The higher the level of educational achievement, the greater the likelihood that an individual will register discontent at substantive inequality. This discontent, however, will be mitigated by institutional integration.
So, how does educational achievement stand among the Turks? It turns out that Turks rank relatively poorly, 90th, on the index of expected years of schooling. Again, there is nothing in the data that jumps out at us.
Finally, although it is a very difficult measure, we might consider institutional integration. Here, as we might expect, Turks do not play a central role in making decisions in their country. The Economist Democracy Index ranks Turkey 88th. (And, lest you think this is an entirely biased metric, take note that the US ranks 21st, behind such countries as South Korea and the Czech Republic in the Economist’s rankings.)
So, why are the Turk’s revolting?
Oddly, the first image that popped into my mind when I asked myself this question was John McCain, who in February 2011 characterized the first hints of the Arab Spring as a dangerous “virus” that held the potential of spreading out of control and infecting many more nations in the region. McCain’s remarks popped into my head for a couple of reasons. First, at the time, it was clear that what Senator McCain most feared was – well – the spread of economic justice and democracy; always bad signs for global economic stability and growth. But, second, I am also thinking of Senator McCain’s eagerness to supply guns to the Sunni opposition in Syria, almost from the beginning, since Asad’s mostly Shi’a minority ruling elite is in bed with Hezbollah; and, well, I’ll let you fill in the blanks. (Oh, by the way, Iran is predominantly Shi’a; Iraq was ruled by the Sunni, before the occupation forces installed a Shi’a led government, which is sympathetic with Iran and . . . Never mind.)
But, that brings me to my third and final point. What if our focus on individual nations at this point is misguided? What if instead we should be looking at the overall global shift in wealth, the shift away from public institutions and public regulations that aim at delivering greater overall substantive equality – in education, health, housing, institutional participation, and movement both within and across state lines?
Was McCain right? Although for all of the wrong reasons?
According to this theory, rather than focusing individually on levels of educational achievement, inequality, institutional integration, and “happiness” within nations, we should instead be looking at the overall aggregate shifts among nations, from public to private, from periphery to core. We should then anticipate that as the global economy contracts and reorganizes, along increasingly neoliberal, post-fordist, lines, bodies of individuals will respond to this reorganization in ways that are informed by local and regional information and practice; but also constrained and channeled by local and regional resources – such as the Turkish state‘s impressive array of military personnel and equipment, much of it supplied by the US.
Yes, like a “virus.” McCain was in earnest about the spread of this virus not out of any particular love for or hatred of individuals along the north African Mediterranean or Arab Penninsula, because because he feared (perhaps rightly) that economic and political democracy might ship-wreck and reverse neoliberal, post-fordist policy trends.
At what point do investors cry “Uncle”? At what point do they realize that their neoliberal policies, even backed by massive police and military powers, stand a chance to cost them much more in returns on investment than ever so slight adjustments in the other direction? Clearly the virus needs to be contained.
Do we wait until it bleeds into Greece and Italy, Spain and Portugal? Do we wait for China to begin showing signs of weakness, provoking China to withdraw (or defend) its investments in South America and Africa?
What if “talking Turkey” means talking about the global distribution of wealth and about its increasingly private, unregulated circuitry about the globe?
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